It’s ungrateful to write about events that have yet to happen. Especially in times when it seems that everything that held yesterday is turned on its head today (for which the American president is primarily responsible, though not solely). That’s why it’s ungrateful to list predictions about the military parade in Moscow on Victory Day. But I’ll take the risk and state that despite the warning by Ukrainian President Zelensky, nothing dramatic will happen to foreign dignitaries in Moscow on May 9. This is due both to the fact that the skies over Moscow will be maximally protected, and even more so because state leaders from dozens of countries will be there, including the first among unequals – Chinese President Xi Jinping. And because any (major) security incident would be immediately attributed to Ukraine, which cannot afford such a thing under the current global power dynamics and battlefield situation. Therefore, it will act with maximum caution.
Regarding other aspects of the parade, there are no major surprises: the Kremlin wants to project an image of a mighty military force supported by an enormous nuclear arsenal. In doing so, it aims once again to emphasize that a Russian military defeat in Ukraine – as desired by most Western leaders – is not possible without the use of nuclear weapons, and to issue yet another threat by drawing red lines that the West must not cross. But the Kremlin’s problem is that it has drawn these lines so many times in the past three years and then remained silent when they were crossed, that among Ukraine’s Western allies there is growing awareness that “nuclear fear is hollow and wrapped in nothing.” In this, the West has a powerful, seemingly surprising ally – the very same first among unequals, the Chinese president. He will be able, in the days surrounding the parade, to once again deliver a direct message to Putin about what is acceptable to China and what absolutely is not. At the top of that list is certainly the use of nuclear weapons. Considering China’s weight, this is a rare message that is still truly heard in the Kremlin today.
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In the context of peace talks about Ukraine, a possible Korean scenario with a temporary ceasefire is increasingly being mentioned recently – one that would evolve, if not into lasting peace, then at least into a less hot phase of conflict without thousands of deaths on both sides. But in the context of Russia’s future, intriguing associations arise with another war and another regime: Saddam’s Iraq.
In the Western collective memory, which is rather short-lived, only a few things remain from Saddam’s time: the infamous Abu Ghraib prison, the toppling of Saddam’s statue after the American invasion in 2003, and the hunt for the once-powerful dictator who was eventually found unshaven and ragged in a hidden shack far from Baghdad. But it’s interesting to look at the broader picture, which reveals notable parallels (as well as differences) between Saddam’s regime in Iraq and Putin’s in Russia.
Starting with differences: I won’t mention many, but the few that are immediately visible carry substantial weight – decisive even, in terms of military confrontation with a foreign force. Russia is certainly not Iraq. It does not have just one (nuclear) bomb that Saddam so desperately wanted – it has thousands. It also has a seat on the UN Security Council, which automatically gives it significant influence in the post-WWII international order. That order may be clinically dead, but it at least outwardly maintains a façade of formal existence. Therefore, any UN Security Council resolutions on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine are doomed to fail from the start – unlike what happened in the 1990s and early 2000s, when Iraq and its alleged weapons of mass destruction were a constant topic of heated political debate among global powers in New York, without a clearly predetermined outcome. Then there’s oil: both Iraq and Russia rely on oil exports as a key source of state revenue. But the crucial difference is that Russia is a much larger exporter and thus a key source of stability in the global oil market. Iraq never held that role and was therefore more easily subjected to numerous sanctions that limited access to global markets and key budgetary revenues.
And that’s it – at least in terms of decisive distinguishing factors. There are dozens more, of course, but they’re better left for historical debates, not columns. Now to the similarities, which are at least equally (if not more) interesting.
In both cases, we are dealing with autocrats – dictators – who, during their rule, developed paranoia to the extent that it completely blinded them. Paranoia regarding their personal safety and “internal enemies” as well as threats outside their countries: Saddam practically believed until the end of his days in a global Zionist conspiracy sponsored by the U.S., whose goal was to destroy the Arab world – and thus Iraq. Similarly, Putin believes Russia is surrounded by dark forces of the decadent West, which have forged a global conspiracy aimed at dismembering and destroying it. Hence, the moment arrived for a pre-emptive strike (the war in Ukraine) and the enforcement of his sphere of influence by force, expanding the borders of the “Russian world.” Saddam built a myth of himself as the leader of a united Arab world at war with Israel; Putin sees himself in the tradition of Tsarist Russia – a great statesman, a conqueror of territories.
Both isolated themselves and made decisions in an informational vacuum, disregarding advice or opinions from their inner leadership circle, let alone from international actors. Saddam lived for decades without paying much attention to the specifics of U.S. political decision-making, the multilateralism of the UN system, or the interests and opinions of other Arab countries. We know where that led Iraq. Similarly, during his 25-year rule, Putin has wrapped himself in his own bubble, leaving little room for others’ opinions. He makes key decisions in this style – including the decision to invade Ukraine (recall the footage of Kremlin meetings before February 22, 2022, when Putin, at a distance, asked members of the Russian Security Council if they supported his policy on Ukraine. Everyone nodded like schoolchildren; SVR intelligence chief Sergey Naryshkin initially hesitated slightly, but Putin immediately publicly humiliated him. In the end, he just said “Yes.”)
It’s no surprise then that both made major miscalculations in their key decisions – overestimating their capabilities or underestimating the international response, or both. For Saddam, this happened in the war with Iran (1980–1988, no winner), and even more in the 1990 annexation of Kuwait. Until then, he had been forgiven much: use of banned chemical and biological weapons, mass repression, and genocide against Kurds. The U.S. and other powers passively observed all this, but due to the sensitive balance of power in the region and Cold War dynamics, chose not to intervene. The annexation of Kuwait changed that. The U.S. intervened militarily, Iraq lost regional Arab allies. Though the U.S. didn’t go all the way and remove the regime then, Saddam never politically recovered. The countdown to the beginning of the end had started. Similarly, Putin was forgiven intervention in Georgia (2008) and annexation of Crimea (2014). But the so-called three-day special military operation has turned into a years-long war of attrition. Russia has lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers (killed and wounded) and achieved virtually none of its stated goals: demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine. Ukraine’s army is now, despite huge losses, more capable and modern than before the war. There’s no sign that Russia has managed to disarm Ukraine politically or subjugate it in the way it has Belarus, where it holds all political and economic decision-making strings. Ukraine, despite all the horrors of war, is now light-years ahead of Russia compared to before the invasion.
So, is it possible that Putin’s imperialist adventure in Ukraine will share the fate of Saddam’s Kuwait trap?
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Since I began with a parade, let me end with one. Saddam’s regime also instituted a Victory Day – on August 8, 1988, he ordered a nationwide celebration of victory in the war with neighboring Iran, which he himself had started eight years earlier. That event also featured plenty of triumphant symbolism, reinforcement of authoritarian rule, and displays of a victory that wasn’t really one: Iraq gained nothing in that war and lost far more – around a million lives, an emptied treasury, impoverished population, and a devastated economy. But all these aspects were carefully swept under the rug. In authoritarian regimes, that doesn’t require much innovation – the manuals have existed for a long time. They just need to be copied effectively, which the Kremlin – at least for its domestic audience – is doing more than successfully.