On the 1st anniversary of the failed Wagner coup, I published a public opinion piece, which was featured in leading Slovenian media (Delo, Večer, Siol).
***
Although the events of June 23, 2023, filled agency news worldwide, it seems that a year later, the entire Russian story around the failed coup of the private Wagner army is almost forgotten. Completely unjustifiably. The events of those days, and even more so the developments in the weeks after, very clearly reveal the modus operandi of the Russian vertical of power in the context of the war in Ukraine. Therefore, they do not deserve to be forgotten, but quite the opposite – to be analyzed even more closely.
To briefly remind: the private military group Wagner, led by Putin’s “chef” Yevgeny Prigozhin, played an important role on the Ukrainian front, especially in the battle for Bakhmut. In the months leading up to June 2023, Prigozhin actively led a public PR campaign against the leadership of the Russian army, mainly targeting the defense minister and the chief of the general staff. The accusations mostly concerned the insufficient arming of the Wagner group, poor command on the front, and consequently, the failures of the Russian army.
On June 23 of last year, members of the group seized the city of Rostov-on-Don (a city of a million people, the seat of the southern military district) and set off in a column of military vehicles to “seize” Moscow. Along the way, they shot down a Russian army helicopter; reportedly, at least 13 Russian soldiers died during the coup. After the intervention of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Putin’s public accusation of an attempted state coup, the Wagner members turned around a few hundred kilometers before Moscow and found temporary refuge in Belarus, where the authorities were supposed to guarantee them immunity. But not for very long: on August 23, 2024, exactly two months after the coup began, Russian authorities shot down a private plane carrying Prigozhin and the entire leadership of the Wagner group. Since then, a collective memory erasure of the Wagner group, Prigozhin, and the role the group played in the war in Ukraine has been taking place in Russia. Following the example of erasing Communist Party leaders during Stalin’s time – as if they never existed.
And the lessons?
First, forget about any laws, constitution, or limitations of power. This case clearly shows that in Putin’s Russia, none of this exists. According to the Russian constitution, private military groups are prohibited. Yet Putin publicly admitted that the state directly richly financed the mentioned group. In addition, around 50,000 (!) Russian prisoners were allegedly fighting on Wagner’s side to buy their freedom. Most died on the battlefield, but several thousand also returned to society and, as seen from daily reports, continue to commit unimaginable violence (including murders, rapes, etc.). Of course, the recruitment of prisoners into a private military group is legally inconceivable.
Second, during the coup, the Russian prosecutor’s office filed charges of treason and attempted state coup against Prigozhin, which were miraculously dropped four days later (June 27). Such a thing is possible only in an authoritarian dictatorship. But that’s not all: it appears that Prigozhin himself believed he was pardoned. But the punishment came – the plane with Prigozhin on board was allegedly shot down over Russian airspace by a surface-to-air missile from the Russian armed forces. State terrorism par excellence.
Third, the very existence and modus operandi of the group was a good illustration of the brutality into which Russian society is increasingly sinking. When the Wagner group, following the example of ISIS, released a video of the execution (killing with a hammer) of their former comrade who had deserted to the Ukrainian side, the Russian authorities did not react. Nothing happened. Therefore, the brutality and slow executions experienced by political prisoners in Russia (including Alexei Navalny) should not come as any particular surprise. This is becoming the new normal of Russian society and the state.
Fourth, the ease with which Prigozhin operated before the coup, as well as the attempted state coup itself, or rather the absence of any serious military resistance in those hours and days, clearly shows all the holes in the command system and the functioning of the Russian army and repressive apparatus. The command was caught with its pants down. The entire military apparatus is riddled with systemic corruption, independently quite ineffective, and dependent on so-called “manual” management, i.e., direct orders from the political leadership. And the recent mass changes in the military structures will not change this; the problems are much bigger and systemically ingrained.
And fifth, there is much more unpredictability in Kremlin decision-making than is visible from the outside. Primarily in the field of foreign policy, as the direction within Russia is clearer – repression following the Soviet model. Externally, however, it is increasingly a rogue state, in whose operations there is very little predictable pragmatism, let alone responsible actions aimed at de-escalating existing security challenges and military conflicts. As such, it will be a tough nut for all Western leaders looking for a path to sustainable peace in Ukraine and the European continent.
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Anniversary of the Failed Wagner Coup: Kremlin Lessons
On the 1st anniversary of the failed Wagner coup, I published a public opinion piece, which was featured in leading Slovenian media (Delo, Večer, Siol).
***
Although the events of June 23, 2023, filled agency news worldwide, it seems that a year later, the entire Russian story around the failed coup of the private Wagner army is almost forgotten. Completely unjustifiably. The events of those days, and even more so the developments in the weeks after, very clearly reveal the modus operandi of the Russian vertical of power in the context of the war in Ukraine. Therefore, they do not deserve to be forgotten, but quite the opposite – to be analyzed even more closely.
To briefly remind: the private military group Wagner, led by Putin’s “chef” Yevgeny Prigozhin, played an important role on the Ukrainian front, especially in the battle for Bakhmut. In the months leading up to June 2023, Prigozhin actively led a public PR campaign against the leadership of the Russian army, mainly targeting the defense minister and the chief of the general staff. The accusations mostly concerned the insufficient arming of the Wagner group, poor command on the front, and consequently, the failures of the Russian army.
On June 23 of last year, members of the group seized the city of Rostov-on-Don (a city of a million people, the seat of the southern military district) and set off in a column of military vehicles to “seize” Moscow. Along the way, they shot down a Russian army helicopter; reportedly, at least 13 Russian soldiers died during the coup. After the intervention of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Putin’s public accusation of an attempted state coup, the Wagner members turned around a few hundred kilometers before Moscow and found temporary refuge in Belarus, where the authorities were supposed to guarantee them immunity. But not for very long: on August 23, 2024, exactly two months after the coup began, Russian authorities shot down a private plane carrying Prigozhin and the entire leadership of the Wagner group. Since then, a collective memory erasure of the Wagner group, Prigozhin, and the role the group played in the war in Ukraine has been taking place in Russia. Following the example of erasing Communist Party leaders during Stalin’s time – as if they never existed.
And the lessons?
First, forget about any laws, constitution, or limitations of power. This case clearly shows that in Putin’s Russia, none of this exists. According to the Russian constitution, private military groups are prohibited. Yet Putin publicly admitted that the state directly richly financed the mentioned group. In addition, around 50,000 (!) Russian prisoners were allegedly fighting on Wagner’s side to buy their freedom. Most died on the battlefield, but several thousand also returned to society and, as seen from daily reports, continue to commit unimaginable violence (including murders, rapes, etc.). Of course, the recruitment of prisoners into a private military group is legally inconceivable.
Second, during the coup, the Russian prosecutor’s office filed charges of treason and attempted state coup against Prigozhin, which were miraculously dropped four days later (June 27). Such a thing is possible only in an authoritarian dictatorship. But that’s not all: it appears that Prigozhin himself believed he was pardoned. But the punishment came – the plane with Prigozhin on board was allegedly shot down over Russian airspace by a surface-to-air missile from the Russian armed forces. State terrorism par excellence.
Third, the very existence and modus operandi of the group was a good illustration of the brutality into which Russian society is increasingly sinking. When the Wagner group, following the example of ISIS, released a video of the execution (killing with a hammer) of their former comrade who had deserted to the Ukrainian side, the Russian authorities did not react. Nothing happened. Therefore, the brutality and slow executions experienced by political prisoners in Russia (including Alexei Navalny) should not come as any particular surprise. This is becoming the new normal of Russian society and the state.
Fourth, the ease with which Prigozhin operated before the coup, as well as the attempted state coup itself, or rather the absence of any serious military resistance in those hours and days, clearly shows all the holes in the command system and the functioning of the Russian army and repressive apparatus. The command was caught with its pants down. The entire military apparatus is riddled with systemic corruption, independently quite ineffective, and dependent on so-called “manual” management, i.e., direct orders from the political leadership. And the recent mass changes in the military structures will not change this; the problems are much bigger and systemically ingrained.
And fifth, there is much more unpredictability in Kremlin decision-making than is visible from the outside. Primarily in the field of foreign policy, as the direction within Russia is clearer – repression following the Soviet model. Externally, however, it is increasingly a rogue state, in whose operations there is very little predictable pragmatism, let alone responsible actions aimed at de-escalating existing security challenges and military conflicts. As such, it will be a tough nut for all Western leaders looking for a path to sustainable peace in Ukraine and the European continent.
Sharing is caring!