Discussions continue: should Western countries allow Ukraine to use their weapons for offensive attacks on Russian territory or not? Is it right to limit Ukraine in choosing legitimate military targets of the aggressor? What are the risks of uncontrolled escalation of military conflict toward a war of (even) greater proportions and a possible nuclear clash? Quickly, we come to the question of so-called red lines, the crossing of which Russia could consider a point of no return and use (tactical) nuclear weapons in Ukraine. A highly relevant debate that should not be easily swept under the rug – in both extreme cases, the outcomes can be extremely tragic, considering the existing security risks for all of Europe.
To start, it would be worthwhile to take a closer look at what we are talking about, as it is sometimes difficult to discern all the key components from broad political statements (many of which we heard during the European election campaign) and simplified media headlines. Only then might it be easier to find paths to answers.
First, when talking about attacks on Russian territory, we mean the internationally recognized Russian borders, excluding all newly occupied Ukrainian territories, including the Crimean peninsula. The Russian authorities have tried to draw a red line on the map so that even Ukrainian attacks on military targets in the occupied territories would count as threats to Russian sovereignty and thus a sufficient reason for using tactical nuclear weapons according to Russian military doctrine. We know this did not happen, as Ukraine targets goals in these territories daily, using Western weapons, mainly medium-range missiles.
Second, the targets of such attacks are primarily border weapon depots, command centers, air forces, and key logistical hubs, primarily refineries. The Russian army, after a logistical and command fiasco in the first year of the war, managed to establish a strong enough logistic support (mainly in the border Russian regions, e.g., in the Belgorod region), through which it conducts a war of attrition with minor movements on both sides of the front. This is particularly evident in these months in Russian attacks on Kharkiv, conducted with the help of a strong back-end on the Russian side, which Ukrainian artillery cannot reach, thus automatically putting it in a weaker position. If Ukraine cannot change this, it will almost indefinitely face new waves of attacks or attempts to breach the front, as Russia will gradually and fairly unhindered conduct support activities in the rear areas.
Third, besides the already limited border Russian military capabilities and rear, military targets include the Russian air force and military airports, even deep within Russia (the Russian army tactically withdrew them from the immediate vicinity of the front and diluted the concentration of aircraft stationed at one airport). Russia still has significant air superiority, which even gradual deliveries of modernized F-16 fighters from Western countries to Ukraine will not drastically change. Therefore, if Ukraine wants to reduce the power of the Russian air force, it must try to destroy them on the ground, i.e., in storage places and airports. This can only be achieved with precise and capable medium- or long-range missiles; it has no other means. Such military means were initially scarce for Ukraine, and their use was partially conditioned by Western countries.
When it is said that a Western government or administration (formally or informally) approved the use of Western weapons on Russian territory, it is necessary to read the “small print.” Thus, the recent approval by Biden’s administration for the use of American weapons was supposed to pertain precisely to the use in the border area, aiming to halt Russian advancement near Kharkiv.
Regarding Ukrainian motives, the matter is more or less clear. Greater unknowns arise on the side of Western countries and their political decision-making. Leaders must constantly maneuver between benefits and costs (risks) in making decisions, dealing with a moving or even receding target. This is a logical consequence of the fact that the situation on the ground and international political conditions are quickly changing (we see how the renewed conflict in the Middle East has shifted global attention), as well as public opinion in the West and internal political conditions (e.g., the presidential elections in the USA). Therefore, it is clear that political decision-making is not easy, which is also seen in the gradualness and partial indecisiveness of Western leaders on this issue.
Besides the most obvious risk of uncontrolled escalation into a war of larger proportions, there is the opposite risk: the negative consequences of not approving the use of weapons for attacks on military targets in Russia. Despite all the billion-dollar financial and military aid, humanitarian support, etc., all the previous support for Ukraine could prove (militarily) inadequate if Ukraine cannot continue to contain Russian advancement. This is not only in the political interest of Zelensky or the national interest of Ukraine but also in the security and strategic interest of the EU and the West. Western military support is one of the key variables defining the (in)success of halting Russian aggression. On the other hand, many military analysts point out that even the potential broader use of Western medium- and long-range weapons for attacks inside Russia will probably not decisively affect the course of the war in terms of Ukraine’s ability to liberate already occupied territories. However, it can decisively influence halting Russian advancement. Are these sufficient (military) benefits in view of the risks on the other side? This is being decided in these months.
Finally, where does the Kremlin stand, and what tactics can the Russian leadership employ? First, it is necessary to distinguish between propaganda outlets and public outbursts of individual Russian political representatives (e.g., former President Dmitry Medvedev) and reality. The former have been threatening with nuclear weapons for a long time, but they have no political influence, nor have their predictions and drawn red lines come true. Meanwhile, political reality is something else entirely: even the Kremlin can lose a lot in the event of uncontrolled escalation. Putin has consolidated power, the regime systematically persecutes and suppresses any socially critical activity, the economy has not collapsed, and life in metropolises (especially Moscow and St. Petersburg) continues in a parallel reality as if there were no war. Putin would gamble all this in the case of military uncontrolled escalation. Moreover, there are Russia’s allies, primarily China, which has repeatedly indicated its opposition to nuclear escalation and probably drew its own red line where support for Russia could stop. This is also why we see that the Kremlin is very cautious and realistically – beyond rhetoric – continues with conventional war in Ukraine while preparing for a long war and attrition.
But this should not lull us to sleep. Putin, with the very start of the war in Ukraine, showed the irrationality of political decision-making, so it is difficult to assess the next steps of the Russian leadership with a certain degree of predictability. Western leaders are likely well aware of this. This is also why we see gradual strategic steps in arming Ukraine: they are dosed in a way that independently does not trigger uncontrolled reactions from the Kremlin but at the same time help Ukraine maintain the front and stop Russian military advancement. But how much longer? Until the US elections or even after? And where is the exit strategy or diplomatic options for (at least) a ceasefire and long-term peace? Unfortunately, it is not yet in sight; Ukraine does not agree to negotiations based on well-known Russian positions (recognition of new borders, demilitarization of Ukraine without any real security guarantees from the international community), and the Kremlin believes it can win this war of attrition against Ukraine and the West. And this is another significant long-term risk that statesmen must consider when assessing the costs and benefits of the scope of further military aid to Ukraine.