In just over a week, we will enter the fifth year of the war in Ukraine. Mentally, for the average Homo sovieticus, this war has already crossed the symbolic threshold separating a so-called “special military operation” (SMO) from a “real war”—one comparable to World War II, which in Russian textbooks began in 1941 and ended with the capture of Berlin. And which, consequently, lasted less time than Putin’s SMO. Therefore, even from the perspective of an average Russian, the time has come to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. But the question is: how realistically close are we to that moment?
Ever since Trump’s autumn ultimatum—demanding that Ukraine sign a “peace” plan sketched out in the Kremlin (a de facto capitulation) by Thanksgiving—speculation has been rife about whether we are gradually entering serious peace negotiations where both sides will have to make compromises, finally leading to peace in 2026. Or are we merely watching an imitation of negotiations, aimed primarily at serving Trump’s personal ambitions for a Nobel Peace Prize, and consequently, a highly specific attempt to dictate the tempo and play the mediator? Are we at the beginning of the end, just at the beginning, or in an alternate reality entirely detached from serious negotiations?
Putin’s Snail’s Pace to Soviet “Glory”
If I had to take a stance on these questions, I would estimate that, measured in months, we are still relatively far from a peace agreement. Here we encounter the core paradox of the current war: the total disconnect between a fairly static battlefield and the “fast,” improvised Trump-style diplomacy. A certain degree of progress in the positions and compromise solutions between Russia and Ukraine has undoubtedly been achieved in recent months. The dynamics of the negotiating groups’ meetings and their composition also point to a new momentum that was absent in the previous years of the war. Yet despite this, we are not seeing even a temporary cessation of hostilities. Russian missiles continue to kill Ukrainian civilians daily, leaving them to freeze in their homes due to systematically destroyed energy infrastructure. So why is there no faster progress?
First, because Putin is not interested in it. He assesses that Russia can achieve most of its declared war objectives—the conquest of the entire Donbas and the restriction of Ukraine’s sovereignty—in the near future through military means. This is what his generals are telling him, reporting almost daily on newly “liberated villages” in the Donbas, even though Russian progress in 2024–2025 was moving at a “snail’s pace”: between Bakhmut, which the Russians captured with massive losses in May 2023, and Pokrovsk, which fell under Russian control towards the end of last year, the distance is a mere 100 kilometers as the crow flies. Measured not only in years but also in enormous human and economic losses, this can only be a Pyrrhic victory for Russia. But not for Putin, who is on a historical mission to make Russia “great” again—to restore its Soviet imperialist glory and to go down in history as one of the greatest conquerors of “Russian” lands. And because he thinks in these categories, and the country is submerged in the same mental propaganda framework, it is no surprise that the Kremlin has no intention of backing down at this point simply because someone in Washington is in a hurry.
“Show Me the Money”
Playing into his hands is the geopolitical situation and the global chaos orchestrated by Trump 2.0, who likes to lend an ear to Russian imperialist ambitions, as they align in many respects with his own view of a world order based on a model of spheres of interest, in which Europe is left to the (un)mercy of the Russian mir (peace/world). Then there is the economic component, which is by no means negligible: Americans close to Trump see massive financial interests in Russia that could quickly materialize upon its return to international markets. Interests in the energy sector, finance, and real estate largely dictate Trump’s interest in shaking hands with Putin. This is not about the MAGA movement or broader American geopolitical interests; it is about the naked financial opportunism of the presidential circle, aiming to make billionaires even richer.
The Kremlin, of course, is not foolish and understands this perfectly well. That is exactly why, instead of experienced diplomats, they send anti-diplomats like Kirill Dmitriev into the negotiating ring. He gets along famously with Trump’s establishment, represented by son-in-law Jared Kushner and real estate mogul Steve Witkoff. Instead of dry diplomatic notes, investment prospectuses are being thrown onto the table. Dmitriev is not selling peace, but opportunities—not just billions, but now supposedly trillion-dollar bilateral Russian-American economic agreements. Trump & Co. enthusiastically yell “show me the money” and ask what it takes to get it. The Kremlin answers simply: nothing too big, just convince the stubborn Zelenskyy and his “neo-Nazi regime” that they have already lost the war and the territories anyway, and that it makes no sense to resist. Have them hand over the territories, you (the Americans) recognize them, and NATO shouldn’t show its face near Russian borders; everything else is just a technical detail. And Trump springs into action. Sound familiar?
Kyiv Between a Bad and a Worse Scenario
The second reason for the deadlock is the fact that the two sides remain far apart on key negotiating issues—control over territories and the future sovereignty of Ukraine. What the Kremlin continues to demand are not compromises, but ultimatums, the kind usually dictated by a victor to a defeated party. But since Ukraine has not lost this war, such ultimatums are unacceptable for Kyiv, as they would mean de facto capitulation. Zelenskyy simply cannot agree to this: not only because it would be political harakiri, but because the majority of Ukrainian society would view it as high treason against the state, national identity, and sovereignty.
At the same time, Kyiv cannot afford not to participate in the peace process dictated by Trump. No matter how painful it might be for Kyiv (which was most apparent during Zelenskyy’s first meeting with Trump a year ago at the White House), a total loss of US support is a significantly worse option. That loss could turn the “snail’s pace” advance of Russian forces into something entirely different within a few months, as Ukraine is critically dependent on American equipment and intelligence for its defense. European allies, despite their political will—which is waning—cannot fill that gap. Therefore, the tactic of participating while simultaneously dismantling the Russian arguments that Trump loves to hear is an entirely rational choice for Zelenskyy. In the absence of better alternatives, it is the only path left to him.
Point X
What should we expect in the coming months? Two interconnected processes must be watched closely. The first is the Russian spring-summer offensive on the remaining 20 percent of the Donetsk region (the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk). This dynamic will influence the negotiating starting points of both sides. In the event of a slow advance, the Kremlin will also be under pressure to rethink its terms, as Russian public financial capacities for a war of attrition are gradually diminishing. The window of time for maximum yield is slowly closing for the Kremlin.
Running in parallel is a political process that could be just as strategically dangerous for Kyiv as a defeat on the battlefield. The Kremlin wants to steer the trilateral process to a point where they can tell Trump that “everything is agreed,” and only Zelenskyy needs to be convinced. Current dynamics suggest we could reach this point by summer, when Trump would issue Ukraine a final ultimatum: either sign the peace agreement (which will most likely be far from fair) or face a complete withdrawal of US support, coupled with the easing of sanctions on Russia. This would allow the Kremlin to breathe easier once again in its war of attrition.
These two processes might converge at the same point in time and decisively impact not only the outcome of this war but the question of war and peace in the whole of Europe. If peace truly becomes merely a transaction between Washington and Moscow, Europe will definitively cease to be a subject of global politics. Until then, we will witness quite a few more rounds of negotiations and “decisive” moments, but nothing so drastic that it would overshadow the aforementioned Point X on the timeline of this war—the peace that we are so close to, yet at the same time, so far from.