These days, global discussions are revolving almost entirely around tomorrow’s Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska. There are countless questions about whether the meeting can bring at least a ceasefire—if not a more lasting peace settlement—or, on the contrary, further divide the U.S. and the EU. Speculation is high, and so are the stakes.
I commented on the developments for Dnevnik and Bloomberg Adria, where I pointed out, among other things, that the meeting poses great risks for Ukraine and Europe in the event of Trump’s freelancing and improvisation, which he is very prone to. The meeting also comes after the U.S. president’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, has been holding bilateral talks with Putin without a broader team, and with no one else from the U.S. administration or the State Department present during discussions with the Russian president. This raises serious questions as to whether the interlocutors (Putin and Witkoff) truly understood each other—or whether this might be another case of something being “lost in translation.” Witkoff has, after all, been in such a situation before.
Furthermore, it is said that Russia is ready for some sort of territorial compromise, and therefore Friday’s talks are expected to focus exclusively on the conditions for a temporary ceasefire. Reportedly, Russia is conditioning such a ceasefire on the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from all four regions not yet fully occupied by Russia (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson), while the Russian army would withdraw from the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, where it controls only a few percent of the territory. If this is the “compromise” as understood by Witkoff and Trump, then it is doomed from the start, as Ukraine will not accept it.
This explains the skepticism ahead of Friday’s meeting, as well as warnings that the Trump-Putin talks could at best bring further ambiguity—benefiting Putin if he succeeds in using this maneuver to stall, or if he secures additional concessions from Trump in exchange for some semblance of Russian concessions, such as on territorial ambitions or political issues like NATO membership or the size of Ukraine’s army. We know that Putin once (during Trump’s first term) successfully deceived him by convincing him that Russia had not interfered in U.S. elections; it is entirely possible he could do so again.
At the same time, assessments persist that Trump’s appeasement of Putin amounts to a so-called “reverse Kissinger approach,” meaning he seeks to weaken the Russia-China strategic partnership in the long term by making concessions to the Kremlin. If this is indeed the Trump administration’s strategy, it is profoundly naïve. The Kremlin has learned over the past two decades that Western administrations and governments change—often even more frequently than once every four years—whereas allies like North Korea and China remain with political leadership that is far more predictable and long-term oriented. For this reason, no carrots or concessions offered to Russia regarding the war in Ukraine will meaningfully alter the strategic and long-term relationship between Beijing and Moscow.
Full article in Dnevnik available here:
https://www.dnevnik.si/novice/svet/kam-bosta-velesili-popeljali-ukrajino-2749464/
Interview in Bloomberg Adria:
https://si.bloombergadria.com/video/zoom-in/22229-srecanje-trumpa-s-putinom-ne-bo-prineslo-konca-vojne-v-ukrajini
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Before Trump-Putin summit on 15 August (short op. ed)
These days, global discussions are revolving almost entirely around tomorrow’s Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska. There are countless questions about whether the meeting can bring at least a ceasefire—if not a more lasting peace settlement—or, on the contrary, further divide the U.S. and the EU. Speculation is high, and so are the stakes.
I commented on the developments for Dnevnik and Bloomberg Adria, where I pointed out, among other things, that the meeting poses great risks for Ukraine and Europe in the event of Trump’s freelancing and improvisation, which he is very prone to. The meeting also comes after the U.S. president’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, has been holding bilateral talks with Putin without a broader team, and with no one else from the U.S. administration or the State Department present during discussions with the Russian president. This raises serious questions as to whether the interlocutors (Putin and Witkoff) truly understood each other—or whether this might be another case of something being “lost in translation.” Witkoff has, after all, been in such a situation before.
Furthermore, it is said that Russia is ready for some sort of territorial compromise, and therefore Friday’s talks are expected to focus exclusively on the conditions for a temporary ceasefire. Reportedly, Russia is conditioning such a ceasefire on the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from all four regions not yet fully occupied by Russia (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson), while the Russian army would withdraw from the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, where it controls only a few percent of the territory. If this is the “compromise” as understood by Witkoff and Trump, then it is doomed from the start, as Ukraine will not accept it.
This explains the skepticism ahead of Friday’s meeting, as well as warnings that the Trump-Putin talks could at best bring further ambiguity—benefiting Putin if he succeeds in using this maneuver to stall, or if he secures additional concessions from Trump in exchange for some semblance of Russian concessions, such as on territorial ambitions or political issues like NATO membership or the size of Ukraine’s army. We know that Putin once (during Trump’s first term) successfully deceived him by convincing him that Russia had not interfered in U.S. elections; it is entirely possible he could do so again.
At the same time, assessments persist that Trump’s appeasement of Putin amounts to a so-called “reverse Kissinger approach,” meaning he seeks to weaken the Russia-China strategic partnership in the long term by making concessions to the Kremlin. If this is indeed the Trump administration’s strategy, it is profoundly naïve. The Kremlin has learned over the past two decades that Western administrations and governments change—often even more frequently than once every four years—whereas allies like North Korea and China remain with political leadership that is far more predictable and long-term oriented. For this reason, no carrots or concessions offered to Russia regarding the war in Ukraine will meaningfully alter the strategic and long-term relationship between Beijing and Moscow.
Full article in Dnevnik available here:
https://www.dnevnik.si/novice/svet/kam-bosta-velesili-popeljali-ukrajino-2749464/
Interview in Bloomberg Adria:
https://si.bloombergadria.com/video/zoom-in/22229-srecanje-trumpa-s-putinom-ne-bo-prineslo-konca-vojne-v-ukrajini
Sharing is caring!